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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN 1919-1920. III1 
VI. ~'l'ROAC'l'IVE CIVIL LEGISLATION 
F IVE of the corporations which fought in vain against exercises of the police power profited nothing from their grasp at the 
obligation-of-contracts clause. In Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light 
Co. v. Wisconsin 2 the contract relied on was a clause in the charter 
of a street railroad imposing on it the duty to keep the space between 
at?-d near its tracks in good repair "with the same material as the 
city shall have last used to pave or repave these spaces and the 
street previous to such repairs, unless the railway company and 
the board of public works of said city shall agree upon some other 
material, and said company shall then use the material agreed 
upon." The company contended that "its obligation is, in any event, 
limited to repaving with such material as the city had last used 
between the rails." Mr. Justice Brandeis, for all the court except 
Justices Pitney and McReynolds, answered : "This would put upo:a 
the city the burden of paving the whole street in case of any inno-
vation in paving save by agreement of the company and the city. 
It is not a reasonable construction of the ordinance." This makes 
the phrase "these spaces and the street" equivalent to "these spaces 
or the street." The pavement required of the company was the 
same as that which the city had laid on all the street but the railway 
zone. The complaint of the road that the expense would reduce 
its income below a reasonable return on its investment was answered 
by saying that "there is no warrant in law for the contention that 
merely because its business fails to earn full six per cent upon the 
value of the property used, the co111pany can escape either obliga-
tions voluntarily assumed or burdens imposed in the ordinary exer-
cise of the police power." 
The contract relied on in Hardin-Wyandot Lighting Co. v. Upper 
Sandusky3 was the statute in force in 1889 when the company's 
1 For the previous installments reviewing cases on Miscellaneous Federal 
Powers, Regulation of Commerce, Taxation, Police Power and Eminent 
Domain, see 19 MxcH. L. REV. 1-24, n7-151 (November and December, 1920). 
2 252 U. S. 100, 40 Sup. Ct. 3o6 (1920), 19 MICH. L. R.Ev. 138. 
1 252 U. S. 173, 40 Sup. <;t. 104 (1919), 19 MICH. L. REV. 139. 
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franchise was granted and accepted. This declare\} that the "mode" 
of use of the streets "shall be such as shall be agreed upon between 
the municipal authorities of the ... village and the company, but 
if they cannot agree, the probate court of the county shall direct 
what the mode of use shall be." In l8g6 the state law was amended 
so that it forbade the construction or maintenance of wires, fixtures 
and appliances for conducting electricity without the consent of the 
municipality. In 1913 the company took down certain poles and 
wires used for lighting the streets. The Supreme Court held that 
it could not restore these or erect new additional ones without 
obtaining the consent of the city; but it interpreted the injunction 
granted below as not applying to the repair and replacing of poles 
and wires which had been continuously used for commercial light-
ing and affirmed the judgment of the state court with the qualifica-
tion, "restrained to the scope of its opinion, as we have interpreted 
it." The case thus rests on the abandonment by the company of 
its rights under the ordinance of 1889 in its poles and wires used 
for street lighting. The statute of 1896, requiring the consent of 
·the city, is sustained as a reasonable exercise of the police power; 
such modification of the company's rights as it may suffer from 
the decree of the state court is said "not to constitute an impairing 
of the obligation of its contract with the state or village." In Pacific 
Gas & Electric Co. v. Police CourP the only contract right adduced 
against a municipal command to sprinkle the streets was the general 
authority conferred by the franchise to operate a road in the streets ; 
but the ordinance was found to be within the police power, and the 
police power was said to dominate the right of the company under 
its franchise to use the streets. 
In two cases the contracts unsuccessfully relied on were with pri-
vate persons rather than with some public authority. Munday v. 
Wisconsin Trust Co.5 sustained the state court in holding a deed 
invalid because the grantee was a foreign corporation which had 
failed to file the requisite papers with the state in which the land 
lay. As the obstructing statute was in force before the transaction 
in question, the court reminded the aggrieved litigant that "the 
settled doctrine is that the contract clause applies only to legislation 
• 251 U. S. 22, 40 Sup. Ct. 79 (1919), 19 M1cH. L. RF.v. 1j9. 
•252 U. S. 499, 40 Sup. Ct. 365 (1920), 19 MICH. L. RF.v. 144. 
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subsequent in time to the contract alleged to have been impaired." 
u'efore the suit began the grantee had obtained a license to do busi-
ness and hold property within the state, but the state court had 
held that this did not validate prior invalid transactions. This was 
said by the Supreme Court· to be wholly a matter of state law and 
to involve no right under the Constitution or I:tws of the United 
States. 
In Producers' Transportation Co; v. Railroad Commission6 the 
plaintiff had previously fixed its rates by private contract and now 
insisted that it was not a common carrier; but the court disagreed 
with it and allowed the state railroad commission to take it in hand. 
Mr. Justice Van Devanter reiterated the well-settled rule that "a 
common carrier cannot, by making contracts for future transporta-
tion or by mortgaging its property or pledging its income, prevent 
or postpone the exertion ~y the state of the power to regulate the 
carrier's rates and practices." To make the matter certain, he added: 
"Nor does the contract clause of the Constitution impose any obstacle 
to the assertion of that power." 
In three cases the contract clause was grasped not as a mere 
makewei~ht but as the only hope against legislation concededly 
within the general police power. In Bank of Oxford v. Love1 it 
was recognized that the charter of a bank was a contract, but the 
provision that the business shall be controlled by the stockholders 
under such rules and regulations as the company may see fit to 
adopt was held not to confer any immunity from a statute requiring 
periodic examination by the state banking department and the impo-
sition of moderate fees for the maintenance of the scrutinizing 
agency. 
In Piedmont Power & Light Co. v. Graham8 the plaintiff attempted 
unsuccessfully to spell out an exclusive franchise from a provision 
in its charter that the town "warrants that it will, by its proper 
authoritie~, provide for the full and free use of its streets, lanes,"' 
etc. Mr. Justice Clarke called the contention "fatuous and futile:' 
and declared that ''grants of rights and priyileges by a state or 
municipality are strictly construed and whatever is not tmequivo-
• 251 U. S. 228, 40 Sup. Ct. 131 (1920), 19 MICH. L. RJ,:v. 137. 
'250 U. S. 6o3, 40 Sup. Ct. 22 (1919). 
"253 U. S. 193, 40 Sup. Ct. 453 (1920). 
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cally granted is withheld; nothing passes by implication." The 
alleged federal question was found so frivolous that the appeal 
from the court below was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 
A similar summary disposition was given to the appeal in Cuya-
hoga River Power Co. v. Northern Ohio T. & L. Co.0 A water-
power company which had been granted the right of eminent domain 
was told that it acquired no exclusive right to any particular lands 
by filing with its articles of incorporation a plan specifying the 
places where it planned to erect dams. "The contention of plain-
tiff," observes Mr. Justice McKenna, "is certainly a bold on-=, and 
seemingly erects into a legal principle that unexecuted intention, or 
partly executed intention, has the same effect as executed intention, 
and that the declaration of an enterprise gives the same right as its 
consummation." The acts of a competing company of which ihe 
frustrated plaintiff complained were held not acts that might be 
attributed to the state as an impairment of plaintiff's contract. No 
wrong was done the plaintiff by incorporating other power com-
panies under the same general law or by sanctioning: the transfer 
of the rights and franchises of a corporation older than itself to one 
younger. 
The contract clause was one of the supports picked out by the· 
successful lighting company in I~os Angeles v. l~os Angeles Gas & 
Electric Corporation,1° and figured at least indirectly in the decision. 
The case held that the city could not compel the company to remove 
poles and wires to make room for a competing municipal system. 
Since the attempt was not a valid police measure and was un:.iccom-
panied by any proffer of compensation, it was held to be inhibited 
by the Fourt-=enth Amendment. But the property rights thus 
wrongfully threatened seem to be regarded as not confined to prop-
erty acquired for the purpose of exercising the powers conferred 
by the franchise, but to embrace also property rights in the fran-
chise itself. To quote Mr. Justice McKenna: 
"A franchise conveys rights, and if th-=ir exercise could 
be prevented or destroyed by a simple declaration of a muni-
cipal council, they would he infirm indeed in tenure and 
'252 U.S. 388, 40 Sup. Ct. 404 (1920). 
10 251 U. S. 32, 40 Sup. Ct. 76 (1919), 19 MrcH. L. Rev. 139· Justice;; 
Pitney and Clarke dissent. 
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substance. It is to be remembered that they came into exist-
ence by compact, having, therefore, its sanction, urged by 
reciprocal _benefits, and are attended and can only be exer-
cised by expenditure of money, making them a matter of 
investments and property, and entitled as such against being 
taken without the proper process of law-the payment of 
compensation." 
The distinction between a breach of contract and an impairment 
of its obligation finds illustration in Hays v. Port of Seattle,11 
already consider'=d in the section on eminent domain. Back in 1896 
the plaintiff made a contract· with the state for excavating part of 
Seattle harbor, the state engaging "to hold the lands subject to the 
operation of the contract pending its execution, and subject to the 
ultimate lien of the contra.ctor thereon." After long delay and dis-
agreement as to plans, the state in 1913 turned the property over to 
the Port of Seattl~, which proceeded to go ahead with the excava-
tion on its own account. This was held to be nothing but a possible 
breach by the state of its contract with the plaintiff, Mr. Justice 
Pitney observing: 
"Supposing the contract had not been abandoned by com-
plainant himself or terminated by his long delay, its obliga-
tion remained·as before, and formed the measure of his right 
to recover from the state for the damages sustained." 
As th-:! state by general law provided ample opportunity to sue and 
to collect a judgment against it, and the infliction on the plaintiff, 
if any, was for a recognized public purpose, an injunction was 
denied and the plaintiff left to his action for damages. 
Two of the tax cases already treated dealt also with objections 
to retroactive legislation. The plaintiff in Okla.lioma R'J'· Co. v. 
Severns Paving Co.12 was told that its charter obligation to pave a 
portion of its right of way implied no agreement on the part of the 
city that prevented a special assessment on the railroad right of 
way to defray part of the expense of paving the main portion oI 
n 251 U. S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct. 125 (1920), I9 MICH. L. REv. I49· 
12 251 U. S. 104, 40 Sup .. Ct. 73 (1919), I9 MICH. L. IU:v. 129. 
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the street. Ward v. Love Count'f~ reiterated the point established 
earlier14 that a tax exemption of .Indian lands granted by Congress 
was a property right which could not, consistently with due process 
of law, be taken away by withdrawal of the exemption. This was 
not directly in issue in the principal case, as the dispute was over 
the question whether the taxes which· the Indians sought to get 
back had been paid voluntarily. Another case in which a tax exemp-
tion, concededly contractual, was held to cover the particular prop-
erty in question is Central of Georgia R)'. Co. v. Wright.u This was 
a rehearing of a portion of a case16 decided the preceding term. 
The opinion is merely a postscript to its predecessor and cannot be 
understood independently.17 
VII. IMMUNITIES OF PERSONS CHARGED WITH CRIME 
The unanimity with which the Supreme Court sustained convic-
tions under the Espionage Law in 19i8-1919 is broken in upon in 
1919-1920. The minority judges, however, do not fully indicate 
how much of their dissent is based on the First AmendtlJ.ent and 
how much goes only to the propriety of the convictions under the 
terms of the statute and the general canons of criminal law. The 
22 253 U. S. 17, 40 Sup. Ct. 419 (1920), 19 MICH. L. ~v. 133. To tho! 
same effect is Broadwell v. Carter County, 253 U.S. 25, 40 Sup. Ct. 422 (1920). 
11 Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665, 32 Sup. Ct. 565 (1912). 
15 250 U. S. 519, 40 Sup. Ct. I (1919). 
18 Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Wright, 248 U. S. 525, 39 Sup. Ct. 181 
(1919), 14 AM. Poi,. Ser. ~v. 63. 
"For notes on Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia, 248 U. S. 372, 39 Sup. 
Ct. u7 (1919), 14 AM. Por.. SCL ~v. 61, holding that a public utility can not 
by contract with its patrons defeat the power of rate regulation, and Columbus 
Ry. Power & Light Co. v. Columbus, 249 U. S. 399, 39 Sup. Ct. 349 (1919). 
13 AM. P~r.. Ser. ~v. 632, holding that a company cannot escape from a 
clause in its franchise restricting the fare to be charged, notwithstanding the 
increase of operating co~ts incident to conditions produced by the war, see 
33 HARV. L. ~- 97, n6. The latter case is considered in 18 MxcH. L. ~. 
320. For discussions of the power to fix rates by contract in the grant of a 
franchise and the power of state authorities to permit an increase of 
rates as against a contract between the company and a city, and other 
phases of the same general problem, see Charles K Burdick, "Regulating 
Franchise Rates," 29 YALE L. J. 58g, N. C. Collier, "Change of Rates of Public_ 
Utility Which Have Been Fixed by Franchise Ordinance," 90 CENT. L. J. 
42, Clarence Dallam, "The Public Utility and the Public Highway," 6 VA. 
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o~ense in the cases was committed by publishing or distributing 
literature that contained unflattering remarks about the motives and 
justificatio~s for _American participation in the war or that covertly 
or directly encouraged or advised restraint from actions that wculd 
aid in its prosecution. In .Abrams v. United States' 8 it was laid 
down by Mr. Justice Clarke for the majority that the only question 
before the court was whether "there was some evidence, competent 
and substantial, before the jury, fairly tending to sustain the ver-
dict." There was denunciation of the President ·as vehement as any 
in a journal devotedly dedicated to uncomplimentary shafts in that 
direction. The court, howev~r, refrained from passing on the pro-
priety of the convictions on the counts charging "disloyal, scurril-
ous and abusive language about the form of government of the 
United States," or language "intended to bring that government 
into contem~t, scorn, contumely, and disrepute." Mr. Justice Clarke 
remarked that "a technical distinction may perhaps be taken between 
L. REV. 35, Godfrey Goldmark, "The Struggle for Higher Pu}?lic Utility 
Rates Because of War-time Costs,'' 5 CoRNEI.L L. Q. 227, A. Raymond San-
born, "The Power of the Public Utilities Commissions to Alter· Rates," 13 
MAINF. L. REV. I, and editorial notes in 20 Cor.uM. L. REv. 704, 5 IowA L. B. 
265, I8 MicH. L. REv. 806, 4 MINN. L. REv. 526, 68 U. PA. L. REV. 280, and 26 
W. VA. L. Q. 67 . . 
For a discussion of United Railroads v. San Francisco, 249 U. S. 5I7, 39 
Sup. Ct. 361 (I9I9), I4"AM. PoL. Sci. R1w. 6o, holding that a statute forbid-
ding two railroads to occupy the same street does not enter into a franchise as 
a promise on the part of the municipal granter not to compete with the 
grantee, see 33 HARV. L. REV. 576, 614. The effect on a contract with a city 
for reduced fares for workmen of a statute prohibiting discrimination is con-
sidered in 29 YALE L. J. 563. The retroactive effect of soldiers' and sailors' 
relief acts is discussed in 4 MINN. L. REv. 353; the amendment of statutes of 
limitation, in 29 YALE L. J. 9I; and the retroactive taking away of a right of 
action for wrongful death in another state, in 33 HAR\'. L. RF.v. 727. 
13 250 U. S. 6I6, 40 Sup. Ct. 17 (I9r9). See Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,~ 
DOM oF SPEECH (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), Chapter 3, "A 
Contemporary State Trial", 33 HARV. L. REv. 747, Edward S. Corwin, "Free-
dom of Speech and Press Under the First Amendment'', 30 YALE L. J. 48, 
"Constitutional Law in 191!)-1920, 14 AM. Por.. Scr. REv. 635, at pp. 655-658, 
M. G. Wallace, "Constitutionality of Sedition Laws", 6 VA. L. REv. 385, John 
H. Wigmore, "Abrams v. United States: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of 
Thuggery in War-time and Peace-time", 14 II.L. L. REv. 539, and notes in 20 
CoLUM. L. REv. go, 33 HARV. L. REv. 442, 474. 14, ILL. L. REv. 6o1, 18 MICH. 
L. REv. 236, 5 VA. L. REG. n. s. 7I5, 29 YAI.E L. J. 337, and 30 YALE L. J. 68. 
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disloyal and abusive language applied to the form of our govern-
ment or language intended to bring the form of our government 
into contempt and disrepute, and language of like character and 
intended to produce like results directed against the President and 
Congress, the agencies through which that form of government must 
function in time of war." But he did not press the point, as he 
found the language fully sufficient to warrant conviction on the 
counts charging utterances intended to provoke resistance to the 
United States in time of war and advocating the curtailment of pro-
duction of ordnance and munitions necessary and essential to the 
prosecution of the war. This was enough to sustain the sentences, 
as they did not exceed those that might be imposed for conviction 
on these counts alone. Among. the exhortations of the defendants 
were the following: 
"Yes, friends, there is qnly one enemy of the workers of 
the world, and that is CAPITALISM. . . . 
With the money which you have loaned or are going to 
loan them they will make bullets not only for the Germans 
but also for the Workers' Soviets of Russia. 1Vorkers in 
the ammunition factories, yoit are producing bullets, ·bayonets, 
cannon, to murder not onl:v the Germans but also your dear-
est, best, who are in Russia and are fighting for freedom . ... 
Workers, our reply to the barbaric intervention has to be 
a general strike. 
Do not let the government scare you with their wild pun-
ishment in prisons, hanging and shooting. \Ve must not and 
will not betray the splendid fighters of Russia. Workers, up 
to fight. 
Know_. yoi, lovers of freedom, that in order to save tl;,c. 
Russian revolution we must keep the armies of the allii>d 
countries busy at home. 
We, the toilers of America, who believe in real liberty, 
shall pledge ourselves, in case the United States will partid-
pate in that bloody conspiracy against Russia, to create so 
great a distttrbance that the atttocrats of America shall be 
compelled to keep their armies at home, and not be able to 
spare any for Rttssia." 
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~or the majority Mr. Justice Clarke declared that "while the imme-
diate occasion for this particular outbreak of lawlessness, on the 
part of th~ defe~dant alien anarchists, may have been resentment 
caused by our government sending troops into Russia as a strategic 
operation against the Germans on the eastern battle front, yet the 
plain purpose of their propaganda was to excite, at the supreme 
crisis of the war, disaffection, sedition, riots, and, as they hoped, 
revolution in this country for the purpose of embarrasing and if 
possible defeating the military plans of the government in Europe." 
~e had earlier laid down that "it will not do to say . . . that the 
only intent of these defendants was to prevent injury to the Rus-
sian cause," for "men must" be held to have intended, and to be 
accountable for, the effects which their acts were likely to produce." 
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes is difficult to deal 
with from the standpoint pf constitutional Jaw, as it does not make 
clear how much it is based on the Constitution. The learned Justice 
conceded that defendants urged curtailment in the production of 
things necessary to the prosecution of the war, and that one of the 
leaflets if published for this purpose might be punishable. He rec-
ognized ~!so that "intent" is at common law satisfied by knowledge 
of facts from which common experience shows that the consequences 
would follow. He adheres to his previously expressed conviction 
that "the United States constitutionally may punish speech that pro-
duces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that 
it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United 
States constitutionally may seek to prevent." This recognizes that 
speech which produces such danger is punishable even though the 
danger is not intended in the strict sense of the word. But Mr. 
Justice Holmes finds the danger lacking in the present case, for he 
says: 
"Now nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publish-
ing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would 
present any immediate danger that its opinions would hinder 
the success of the government arms or have any appreciable 
tendency to do so." 
This seems to be the nub of the dissent so far as it goes on consti-
tutional grounds. The majority allow the jury to infer sufficient 
danger from the circumstances. 'The minority thi~k the inference 
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unjustified because of the silliness of the leaflet and the unimpor-
tance of 'its authors. To them the circumstances do not as a mere 
matter of inference show th?.t degree of danger which is necessary 
before freedom of speech can be curtailed consistently with the 
First Amendment. The opinion at this point is plainly concerned 
with the constitutional issue, for it follows the introduction : 
"The power undoubtedly is greater in time of war than 
in time of peace, because war opens dangers that do not 
exist at other times. 
But as against dangers peculiar to war. as against others, 
the principle of the right of free speech is always the same. 
It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent 
to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit 
to the expression of opinion where private rights are not con-
cerned. Congress certainly cann_ot forbid all_ effort to c.hange 
the mind of the country." 
On the question of the interpretation of the statute the dissenting 
opinion takes the position that "encouraging resistance" is not satis-
fied by encouraging abstinence from assistance, and that "intent" 
must be construed in the strict and accurate sense and not as vaguely 
used in ordinary legal discussion. The inference from the opinion 
is that the First Amendment requires either intent in the sense of 
aim, motive, or object, or else a clearer, nearer danger from the 
words used than could be thought by a reasonable man to be present 
in the principal case. There is also the suggestion that th_e First 
Amendment limits the degree of punishment for speech conc<:dedly 
punishable, though it may be that Mr. Justice Holmes has the due-
process clause of the Fifth Amendment in mind when he says: 
"In this case sentences of twenty years' imprisonment 
have been imposed for the publishing of two leaflets that I 
believe the defendants had as much right to publish as the 
Government has to publish the Constitution of the United 
States now vainly invoked by them. Even if I am technically 
wrong and enough can be squeezed from these poor and puny 
anonymities to turn the color of legal litmus paper; I will 
add, even if what I think the necessary intent were shown; 
the most nominal punishment seems to me all that could pos-
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sibly be inflicted, unless the defendants are to be made to 
suffer not for what the indictment alleges but for the creed 
that they avow-a creed that I believe to be the creed of 
ignorance and immaturity when honestly held, as I see no 
reason to doubt that it was held here, but which, although 
made the subject of examination at the trial, no one has a 
right even to consider in dealing with charges before this 
Court." 
The concluding· clause may refer to Mr. Justice Clarke's remark 
on ''this particular outbreak of lawlessness, on the part of the 
defendant alien anarchists." That the difference of opinion amor..g 
the judges goes back to a difference in fundamental faiths as to 
what is most important in the process of government is evident 
from the concluding paragraph of the dissenting opinion. Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes reveals not a little of what constitutional interpretation 
owes to the fundamental faiths of the judges when he says:· 
"Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me 
perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or 
your power and want a certain result with all your heart, 
you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away 
all opposition. To allow opposition by speeeh seems to indi-
cate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says 
that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole-
heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your pow~r 
or your premises. But when men have realized that time 
has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe 
even more than they believe the very foundations of their 
own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached 
by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power 
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which 
their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is 
the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all 
life is an experiment. Every year, if not every day, we 
have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon 
imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our 
system, I think that we should be eternally vigilant against 
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attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe 
and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so immi-
nently threaten immedi~te interference with the lawful and 
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is 
required to save the country. I wholly disagree with the 
argument of the Government that the First Amendment left 
th~ common law as to seditious libel in force. History seems 
to me against the notion. I had conceived that the United 
States through many years had shown its repentance for the 
Sedition Act of 1798 (Act July 14, 1798, c. 73, I Stat. 596) 
by repaying fines that it imposed. Only the emergency that 
makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of 
evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to the 
sweeping command, 'Congress shall make no law abridging the 
freedom of speech.' Of course, I am speaking only of cxpre.;-
sions of opinion and exhortations, which were all that were 
uttered here, but I regret that I cannot put into more impres-
sive words my belief that in their conviction upon this indict-
ment the defendants were deprived of their rights under the 
Constitution of the United States." 
Mr. Justice Brandeis, who joined in this dissent, wrote the dis-
senting opinion in Pierce v. United States,1° in which Mr. Justice 
Holmes was again of the minority. This opinion is largely con-
cerned with maintaining that the pamphlet distributed by the defend-
ants did not contain false statements within the meaning of the 
statute. In insisting that the question of the truth or falsity should 
not have been left to the jury, Mr. Justice Brandeis observed: 
"To hold that a jury may make punishable statements of 
conclusions or of opinion, like those here involved, by declar-
ing them to be statemeAts of facts ai;id to be false would 
practically, de~y members of small political parties freedom 
of discussion in times when feelings run high and the ques-
tions involved are deemed fundament~l." ' 
On the constitutional issue, the· dissenting opinion relied on the 
conviction ·that the nature of the leaflet and the circumstances of 
"251 U.S. 205, 40 Sup. Ct. 239 (1920).· 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN I9I9-I920 295 
its distribution were not such as to create any clear and present 
danger of harmful results. It refers to the note of despair in the 
offending tract, with its recognition of the hopelessness of protest 
under the existing system and the irresistible military might of the 
government, and says that "it is not conceivable that any man cf 
ordinary intelligence and normal judgment would be induced" 
thereby to commit offense and run the risk of the penalties. Mr. 
Justice Brandeis closes by saying: 
"The fundamental right of free men to strive for better 
conditions through new legislation and new institutions will 
not be preserved if efforts to secure it by argument to fellow 
citizens may be construed as criminal incitement to disobey 
the existing law-merely because the argument presented 
seems to those exercising judicial power to be unfair in its 
portrayal of existing evils, mistaken in its assumptions, 
unsound in reasoning and intemperate in language. No 
objections more serious than these can, in my opinion, rea-
sonably be made to the arguments presented in '1'he Price 
We Pay.'" 
Here, as in the Abrams case, the majority took the position that 
whether the printed words would in fact produce as a proximate 
result the substantive evils which concededly Congress may strive 
to prevent "is a question for the jury to decide in view of all the 
circumstances of the time and considering the place and manner 
of distribution." Intent under the statute and under the Consti-
tution is something that the jury may infer from probable conse-
quences. The words that can he punished are those that have a 
sufficiently dangerous tendency. 
This is reiterated by Mr. Justice McKenna in the majority opinion 
in Schaefer v. United States,20 in which the defendants were con-
victed of publishing false statements with the intent of promoting 
the success of the enemies of the United States. The gist of the 
offending articles was that the motives of Great Britain in entering 
the war were not so disinterested as they might have been, and that 
the United States was bluffing and would never send an effective 
""251 U.S. 4)6, 40 Sup. Ct. 259 (1920). See 29 YALi;: L. J. 677. 
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army to the front. Mr. Justice Brandeis in dissenting insisted that 
"men, judging in calmness . . . could not reasonably have said that 
this coarse and . heavy humor immediately threatened the success 
of recruiting." But Mr. Justice McKenna answered: 
"Coarse, indeed, this was, and vulgar to us ; but it was 
expected to produce, and it may be did produce, a different 
effect upon its readers. To them its derisive contempt may 
have been truly descriptive of American feebleness and 
inability to combat Germany's prowess, and thereby chill 
and check the ardency of patriotism and make it despair of 
success, and in hopelessness relax energy both in preparation 
and action. If it and the other articles . . . had not that 
purpose, what purpose had they? Were they the mere expres-
sion of peevish discontent, aimless, vapid, and innocuous? 
We cannot so conclude. We must take them at their word, 
'as the jury did, and ascribe to them a more active and sinister 
purpose. They were the publications of a newspaper, delib-
erately prepared, systematic, always of the same trend, more 
specific in some instances, it may be, than in others. Their 
effect, or the persons affected, could not be shown, nor was 
it necessary. The tendency of the articles and their efficacy 
were enough for the offense-their 'intent' and 'attempt,' 
for those are the words of the act-and to have required 
more would have made the law useless. It was passed in 
precaution. The incidence of its violation might not be imme-
diately seen, evil appearing only in disaster, the result of the 
disloyalty engendered and the spirit of mutiny." 
Mr. Justice Holmes joined in the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis; 
and Mr. Justice Clarke this time opposed the majority, but not on 
constitutional grounds. The disagreement between the judges on 
the constitutional issue comes down to a question of degree as to 
the extent to which the court will allow the jury to surmise as to 
the probable effect of the objectionable language. In all the cases 
which have come before the Supreme Court the defendants were 
preaching a gospel which, if acted upon, would be a drag on the 
prosecution of the war. It seems safe to sum up the constitutional 
law made by the decisions by saying that the First Amendment 
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c<?nfers no immunity on such preaching even when confined to insin-
uation and innuendo. Yet it would be easy to think of much advo-
cacy which would in fact hamper the conduct of the war much 
more griev"ously than any words of those now serving sentence, but 
which would never be thought punishable if coming from those 
whose heart is in the popular place. It might be that in dealing 
with prosecutions under such circumstances Mr. Justice Holmes 
would find more agreement with his emphasis on the stricter mean-
ing of "intent." He suggests hypothetical cases where patriots, 
thinking that we were wasting money on aeroplanes or making 
more cannon of a certain kind than necessary, successfully advo-
cated a curtailment of prodtiction which turned out to hinder the 
prosecution of the war.21 
Two more espionage cases may be disposed of briefly. In O'c;·n-
nell v. United States22 the court was unanimous in sustaining the 
Espionage Law and the Selective Service Law on the authority of 
cases decided since the writ of error was sued out. The latter act 
wa-s held to cover obstruction by non-official as well as official per-
sons. No question of freedom of speech was involved. Stilson v. 
United ~tates23 did not review the evidence in any detail and adds 
nothing to the cases already considered. On one of the counts 
the government did not press the conviction; Justice Holmes and 
Justice Brandeis thought that as the sentence was upon a general 
verdict of guilty on both counts, the judgment should be reversed, 
but none of their colleagues agreed. The case also held ·that the 
trial by an impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment does 
not include the privilege of peremptory challenges and that there-
fore defendants tried jointly cannot complain that the peremptory 
challenges are no more numerous than when one is tried alone. 
:n For general articles on freedom of speech, see Thomas F. Carroll, 
"Freedom of Speech and the Press in the Federalist Period", I8 MICH. L. 
REv. 615, Robert Ferrari, "Political Crime", 20 CoLUM. L. REv. 3o8, Fred B. 
Hart, "Power of Government over Speech and Press", 29 YALE L. J. 410, 
and Theodore Schroeder, "Political Crimes Defined", I8 M1cH. L. REv. 30. 
Notes on various aspects of espionage and similar laws appear in 20 COLU,M. 
L. Rsv. 222, 483, 700, I8 MICH. L. Rsv. 167, 7g8, and 6 VA. L. REv. 53. 
"'253 U. S. 142, 40 Sup. Ct. 444 (1920). 
"250 U. S. 583, 40 Sup. Ct. 28 (1919). See 29 YALE L. J. 363 for com-
ment on the question of challenge involved in the case. 
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In Stroud v. United States24 there were contentions of double 
jeopardy and self-incrimination. Mr. Stroud had been convicted 
of murderi with a recommendation by the jury against capital pun-
ishment, which under the statute ·was binding. He asked for a new 
trial and got it, and this time was convicted of murder, with no 
recommendation by the jury as to sentence. Under the statute he 
was sentenced to death. The court fomid that the first conviction 
as well as the second was of murder in the first degree aJ?.d applied 
the established rule that, since the defendant himself invoked the 
action of the court which resulted in a second trial, he was not 
thereby placed in second jeopardy within the meaning of the Con-
stitution.25 Allegations that the jury which brought in the second 
verdict was not an impartial one, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment, were based on the facts that some of the prospective jurors 
were present at preliminary proceedings at which statements preju-
dicial to the defendant were made and that the trial court refused 
to transfer the case to another division of the district. Jurors from 
the immediate vicinity were, however, excluded from the panel, and 
Mr. Justice Day said that "matters of this sort are address.ed to the 
discretion of the trial judge, and we see nothing in the record to 
amount to abuse of discretion such as would authorize an appellate 
court to interfere with the judgment." The complaint of self-
incrimination was founded on the refusal of the trial court to grant 
an application for a· return to the defendant of letters written by 
him in prison and turned over by the warden to the district attor-
ney. The court answered that the letters were voluntarily written, 
that no threat or coercion was used to obtain them, nor were they 
seized without process, and that having come into the possession of 
the prison officials "under established practice, reasonably designed 
to promote the discipline of the institution * * * there was neither 
testimony required of the accused, nor unreasonable search and 
seizure in violation of his constitutional rights." 
"251 U. S. 15, 40 Sup. Ct. 50 (1919). See 5 VA. L. REG. n. s. 882, and 
6 VA. L. REv. 457. For a rehearing on the question of chaltenge under the 
statute, see Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 380, 40 Sup. Ct. 176 (1920) . 
.. For discussions of double jeopardy, see 68 U. PA. L. REv. 70, on former 
conviction for robbery as a bar to prosecutioµ for murder, and 6 VA. L. Ri;v. 
372, on the same act as an offense against the state and a municipality. 
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A different result was reached in Silverthorne Lwmber Co. v. 
United States.2a Governmental officials raided the offices of a cor-
poration after arresting its offic~rs, took away papers without any 
search warrant, photographed them, retained photographs and 
copies after returning the originals by order of the court upon appli-
cation by the defendants, framed a new indictment on the basis of 
the knowledge thus gained, and then obtained a subpoena to i;ro-
duce the originals. For refusing to ob.;y the subpoena the corpora-
tion and one of its officers were found guilty of cont~mpt. The 
Supreme Court held the subpoena unlawful as a violation of the 
constitutional prohibition against unreasonabie searches and seizures. 
As Mr. Justice Holmes puts it: 
"The proposition could not be presented more nakedly. 
It is that, although of course its seizure was an outrage 
which the Governm·~nt now regrets, it may study the pap:!rs 
before it returns them, copy them, and may then us~ the 
knowledge that it has gained to call upon the owners in 
more regular form to produce them; i.hat the protection of 
the Constitution covers the pliysical possession but not . .my 
advantages that the Government can gain over the object of 
its pursuit by doing the forbidden act." 
It had already be:n held that papers so seized could not, after proper 
objection, be laid directly before the grand jury. The idea that this 
means only that two steps are required instead of one was .said to 
reduce the Fourth Amendment to a form of words. Mr. Justic:! 
Holmes then continues: 
"The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of 
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so 
acquired shall not be used before the court, but that it shall 
not be used at all. Of course, this does not mean that the facts 
thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge 
of them is gained from an independent source they may be 
proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the 
"252 U:. S. 385, 40 Sup. Ct. 182 ( 1920). See 8 CAI.IF. L. Riv. 347, 20 
Cor.. L. REV. 484, 33 HARV. L. Ri;v. 869, 4 MINN. L. Rr.v. 447, 6 VA. L. Ri;c. 
n. s. 223, and 29 Y Ar.£ L. J. 553. 
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Government's own wrong cannot be us-:!d by it in the way 
proposed." 
The protection of the decision was accorded to the corporation 2.S 
well as to the aggrieved individual. \Vhile corporations are not 
privileged to refuse to produce self-incriminating books and papers, 
as individuals are, under a judicial blending of the search-and-
seizure and self-incrimination clauses of the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, "the rights of a corporation against unlawful search 
and seizure are to be protected even if the same result might have 
been achieved in another way." The case is rested on the Fourth 
Amendment without any admixture of the Fifth with its privilege 
against self-incrimination. Chief Justice White and Mr. Justice 
Pitney dissented, but without opinion.27 
The clause of the Sixth Amendment entitling persons accused of 
crime against the federal government to trial "by an impartial jury 
of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed" 
is involved in Gayon v. ,~fcCartl'liJl,25 though the issue does nnt 
appear to have been raised by the accused. Gayon while in New 
York conspired with persons in Texas, and the acts of his fellow 
conspirators in Texas were declared to establish the jurisdiction of 
the federal district court in Texas to indict Gayon.29 This case and 
another3° passed on procedural questions relating to removal of the 
accused from one federal district to another. A third case31 
involved -similar questions of procedure m arrest for extradition 
to a foreign country.32 
21 For discussions of self-incrimination, see A. M. Kidd, "The Right to 
Take Finger-prints, Measurements and Photographs", 8 CALIF. L. REv. 25, 
D. 0. McGovney, "Self-Criminating and Self-Disgracing Testimony'', 5 IowA 
L. Bur.L. 175, Roy Cleasey Merrick, "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion as to Charges of Contempt", 14 ILL. L. REv. 171, a note in 8 CALIF. L. 
REv. 241 on powers exercised under the federal Trade Commission Act, and 
a note in 14 Ir.r.. L. REv. 644 on self-incrimination under the National Prohi-
bition Act. 
03 252 U. S. 171, 40 Sup. Ct. 244 (19w). 
20 For question of venue for trial when blow is in one county and death 
in another, see 20 Cor.UM. L. REY. 619, and 33 HARV. L. REY. 843, 863. 
30 Stallings v. Splain, 253 U. S. 339, 40 Sup. Ct. 537 (1920). 
31 Collins v. Miller, 252 U. S. 364, 40 Sup. Ct. 347 (1920). 
02 Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U. S. 376, 40 Sup. Ct. 388 (1920), held that a 
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VIII. JURISDIC'l'ION AND PRoc:EouRF. OF CouR'I'S 
I. '(he E~tent of Federal Judicial Power 
An attempt by a -citizen of New Jersey to sue that state in an 
original proceeding in the Supreme Court of the United States was 
readily frustrated in Duhne v. N eu1 J ersey.83 The bill was brought 
to enjoin the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment. The only 
possible ground for starting such a proceeding in the Supreme 
Court was that the suit was one in which a state is a party. But 
the court pointed out through the Chief Justice that the third sec-
tion of Article III, which describes the original jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, ''relates solely to the grounds of federal jurisdic-
tion" conferred in the preceding section, "and hence solely deals 
with cases in which the original jurisdiction of this court may be 
resorted to in the exercise of the judicial power as previously 
given." Since it is well settled that the federal judicial po,~er does 
not embrace a suit brought by a citizen against a state without its 
consent, the contention of the plaintiff was said to come "to the 
proposition that the clause relied upon provides for the exerdse by 
this court of original jurisdiction in a case where no federal judicial 
power is conferred." Permission to file the bill was therefore refused. 
Whether the action was one against the federal government, in so 
far as it sought to enjoin federal officers, was not considered, inas-
much as the action against those officers had no claim to be brought 
originally in the Supreme Court, and the effort necessarily fell flat 
soldier in the army charged with the murder of a civilian is within the juris-
diction of state courts even in time of war, since the Articles of War do not 
clearly make the jurisdiction of courts martial exclusive. 
For discussions of the Court-martial system, see S. T. Ansell, "Military 
Justice'', 5 CoRNnL L. Q. r, George Gleason Bogert, "Courts-Martial: Criti-
cisms and Proposed Reform", 5 CoRNJU.L L. Q. 18, and Edmund M. Morgan, 
"Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Non-Military Persons Under the Articles of 
War", 4 MINN. L. REv. 79, and1 "The Existing Court-Martial System and the 
Ansell Army Articles", 29 Y AL'S L. J. 52. 
See 18 MICH. L. REv. 810 for discussion of question whether a criminal 
statute is void for indefiniteness; 33 HARV. L. REv. 449, 473, · for differing 
penalties for men and women under equal protection of the laws ; and 6 VA. 
L. REv. for imprisonment for non-payment of alimony. 
13 251 U.S. 3u, 40 Sup. Ct. 154 (1920). See 5 VA. L. REG; n. s. 88r, and 
29 YAL"S L. J. 471. 
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wJ:ien it was determined that the plaintiff could not hale the state 
before that court.31 
An effor~ by t~e Secretary of the Treasury to resist proceedings 
brought against him in the Supreme Court of the District of 
Columbia~ on the ground that the suit was one against the United 
States, met with defeat in Houston v. Ormes.35 The proceeding 
was one by an attorney to establish an equitable lien for her fees in 
a fund in the treasury of the United States appropriated to pay a 
claim found by the Court of Claims to be due her client. The client 
h~d been made a party and had appeared and unsuccessfully 
defended. This was held to get rid of the objection that debts due 
from the United States have no situs at the seat of government and 
that therefore the decree against the secretary in favor of the attor-
ney could not protect the government from subsequent suit by the 
client. The federal statt\te forbidding the assignment of claiw.s 
against the government was put to one side as not standing in the 
way of assignment by operatiol}. of law ·after the claim has been 
allowed. ~his left only the question whether the suit to establish 
a lien on the fund was a suit against the United States. As to this, 
Mr. Justjce Pitney said: 
"But since the fund in ·question has been appropriated by 
act of Congress for payment to a specified person in satis-
faction of a finding of the Court of Claims, it is clear that 
the officials of the Treasury are charged with the ministerial 
duty to make payment on demand to the person designated. 
I~ is settled th~t in such a case a suit brought by the person 
entitled to the performance of the duty against the official 
charged with its performance is not a suit against the gov-
ernment."36 
The extent of the adi:niralty jurisdiction was involved in two 
cases already dealt with. In Peters v. Veasey,87 a longshoreman 
a< See 4 MINN L. Rr:v. 364 for a discussion of a provision in the yirginia 
constitution held to be self-executing and to give the right to sue the state 
and its subdivisions without further legislative action. 
""252 U.S. 469, 40 Sup. Ct. 369 (1920) . 
.. For consideration of other instances in which suit was resisted as one 
against the United States, see 8 CALIF. L. Rr:v. 342, 20 CoLUM. L. Rr:v. 217, 5 
<'-0RNELL L. Q. 203, and 33 HARV. L. Rr:v. 322. 
31 251 U.S. 121, 40 Sup. Ct. 65 (1919). 
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injured on a ship by falling through a hatchway, and in Knicker-
bocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,38 a bargeman injured when doing unnamed 
work said to he ·of a maritime nature, were held not entitled to the 
remedies of state ·compensation laws. There appeared to be no 
dispute in either case that the injury was within the admiralty juris-
diction. The decision that Congress could not permit the apJ?lica-: 
tion of state compensation laws has already been reviewed.39 
The question whether a case is within the federai jurisdiction 
because one arising under the Constitution of the United States 
necessarily involves an interpretation of the clause of the Consti-
tution relied on by the party who seeks to get into the federal courts. 
The Supreme Court has develepod the practice of saying that it 
has no jurisdiction to answer frivolous questions or questions already. 
completely disposed of. So 1t turns down preposterous objections 
by dismissing them for want of jurisdiction. There is, of course, 
only a formal difference between such procedure and the alternative 
one of entertaining jurisdiction and holding the objection one worth 
making but nevertheless ill-founded. Cases in which substantive 
federal questions have actually been disposed of have been treated 
together in this review, whether or not objection was raised to the 
exercise of jurisdiction. 
The question whether the suit arose under a law of the United 
States was the issue in Pell v. McCabe.40 This was a bill brought 
in the district court to enjoin a suit for fraud against the l)etitioner 
who in previous bankruptcy proceedings brought primarily against 
others had been determined not to be a general partner and there-
fore not subject to having his assets administered in the bankruptcy 
proceedings. The later suit against him for fraud was held to be 
quite independent of anything adjudicated in the bankmptcy pro-
ceedings and therefore one properly within the jurisdiction of the 
state court and not to be enjoined by the federal court by reason of 
its jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters. In First National Bank 
v. Williams,41 however, a suit by a national hank against the comp-
troller of the currency to enjoin alleged harassing actions on his 
""253 U.S. 149, 40 Sup. Ct. 438 (1920). 
'"19 MrcH. L. Ri;v. 13-14 
'°250 U.S. 573, 40 Sup. Ct. 43 (1919). 
41 252 U.S. 504, 40 Sup. Ct. 372 (1920). 
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part was held to be one in which the right to recover turns on the 
construction and application of the National Banking Act, and 
therefore one arising 1ender that act, even though not expressly 
authorized "by it to be brought. It followed from this that under 
another statute the comptroller might be sued in the district where 
the bank is located. 
In such cases as the foregoing it is often difficult to tell whether 
the issue is constitutional or merely one of statutory construction. 
'II/heh jurisdiction is entertained, the case is of course within ·the 
fe_deral judicial power. But jurisdiction may be denied solely fot: 
want of statutory warrant for entertaining it. Sometimes the stat-
utory limits are coterminous with the constitutional limits and 
sometimes not. Clearly questions whether the judgment below is 
a final one,42 whether the federal issue is raised in season,43 whether 
"Ex parte Tiffany, 252 U. S. 32, 40 Sup. Ct. 239 (1920), held final an 
order of the district court d'enying .an applica'tion to require a .receiver to 
tum over property to a receiver appointed by a state court. United States v. 
Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 40 Sup Ct. 289 (1920), held a ruling sustaining a. 
motion to quash an indictment to be a "decision or judgment sustaining a 
special plea in bar" so as to authorize the government to take a direct writ 
of error from the district court to the Supreme Court under the Criminal 
Appeals Act. The case held also that the Pennsylvania rule that a grand jury 
may not, without leave of court, bring in a new bill on matters previously sub-
mitted to another grand jury, is not the common law, as rightly perceived, 
and therefore not the rule for federal courts. The federal rule is not statu-
tory, but is the product of the federal court's superior conception of the 
common law. The Pennsylvania rule is not adopted as the rule for federal 
courts by section 722 of the Revised Statutes, for that applies only in the 
absence of a federal rule on the subject. Collins v. Miller, 252 U. S. 364, 40 
Sup. Ct. 347 ( 1920), held a decision of ~e district court not final because it 
disposed finally of only a part of the case. The Supreme Court raised of its 
own motion the question of the lack of finality. It remarked obiter that the 
construction of a treaty by the district court in a final decision is subject to 
direct review by the Supreme Court. Oneida Navigation Corporation v. W. 
&. S. Job & Co., 252 U. S. 521, 40 Sup. Ct. 357 (1920) held not final the dis-
missal by the district court of a petition to bring in another defendant alleged 
to be liable for a collision. Here again :the Supreme Court raised the ques-
tion of finality of its own motion. See 33 HARv. L: REv. 1076 for a note on 
finality of decision for purposes of appeal. 
.. Godchaux Co. v. Estinople, 251 U. S. 179, 40 Sup. Ct. n6 (1920) held 
it too late to raise a federal question for the first time on a petition for a re-
hearing in the state supreme. court, where that court does not actually enter-
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the suit involves ~he requisite amount to be brought in the federal · 
courts/4 and \yhether the complaint goes to the validity of some 
authority exercised or only to some other right, title or interest 
under the federal Constitution or laws,45 are questions . solely of 
statutory construction. No constitutional issue seems to be involved 
in decisions dismissing a bill because the question raised has become 
tain the petition and pass on the objection. Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. 
Davis, 251 U. S. 256, 40 Sup. Ct. 133 (1920), affirms the same point, and also 
decides that the state decision was final. Hiawassee River Power Co. v. 
Carolina-Tennessee Power Co., 252 U. S. 341, 40 Sup. Ct. 331 (1920), holds 
the federal question presented too late when. first raised on petition for writ 
of error filed in the federal Supreme Court. Objection was seasonably raised 
to introducing in evidence a charter, but its reception in evidence was held to 
violate no federal right. 
"Chesbrough v. Northern Trust Co., 252 U.S. 83, 40 Sup. Ct. 237 (1920), 
refused to order the district court to dismiss for want of jurisdiction an 
action for tort in which the alleged damages exceeded the prescribed amount 
and there was nothing to show that such a recovery was impossible or that 
there was bad faith. Scott v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 243, 40 Sup .Ct 503 (1920), 
ordered a bill dismissed for want of allegation that the amount in controversy 
equals that required by the statute. See 33 HARV. L. Rl>v. 477 for a note on 
good faith in alleging the amount in controversy. 
••Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Davis, 251 U. S. 256, 40 Sup. Ct. 133 
(1920), note 43, supra, held that the claim that a lease contract was an inter-
state-commerce contract and therefore not subject to state statutes does not 
challenge the validity of the statute so as to justify a writ of error from the 
state court, but at most asserts a right, title, or interest under the federal 
Constitution which might be the basis for a writ of certiorari. Jett Bros. Co. 
v. City of Carrollton, 252 U. S. l, 40 Sup. Ct. 255 (1920), held that a com-
plaint that petitioner's property was assessed at full value while other 
property was assessed at thirty or forty per cent of its value does not ques-
tion the validity of a statute or an authority exercised under it as against the 
Constitution of the United States so as to warrant a writ of error. Mr. 
Justice Day says that "the mere objection to an exercise of authority under a 
statute whose validity is not attacked cannot be made the basis of a writ of 
error to this court." This case repeats that it is too late to raise the federal 
question on petition for a rehearing in the state court when that court does 
not give it consideration. For an extensive note on the consid'erations deter-
mining whether writ of error or certiorari is the proper device to bring a 
case from the state court to the United States Supreme Court, see 33 HARV. 
L. Riw. 102. The cases outlined in the present note and in the two preceding 
do not exhaust the list of those in which the Supreme Court considered 
similar issues during the past term, but are given merely to illustrate the 
blunders that occur in matters of practice. 
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tI?-OOt by the amendment of a statute/a or allowing an alien enemy 
to proceed as party plaintiff where adequate precautions are taken 
against paying a_ judgment to him personally,47 or holding that a 
soldier in the army charged_ with tbe murder of a civilian is within 
the jurisdiction of a state court even in time of war, since the Arti-
cles of War do not clearly make the jurisdiction of the courts mar-
tial exclusive.48 The reports of the decisions of each term are 
crowded with disputes on questions of _federal practice. The igno-
rance and/or the perversity of attorneys impose on the Supreme 
Court an excess of unnecessary burden. The burden appears not 
only in the cases in which op~nions are written but still more in the 
many instances in which decisions are disposed of in a memoran-
dum. Cases of this latter character are not included in this review. 
Needless to say, they frequently represent the determination of a 
constitutional question. If the question is not regarded by the 
Supreme Cottrt as one worth discussing, the reviewer may perhaps 
be pardoned for emulating its example.49 
~United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. II3, 40 Sup. Ct 448 ( 1920). 
"Birge-Forbes Co. v. Heye, 251 U.S. 317, 40 Sup. Ct. 160 (1920) . 
.. Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376, 40 Sup. Ct. 388 (1920). 
~·For other discussions of the jurisdiction of the federal courts see 
Armistead M. Dobie, "Jurisdiction of the United States District Court as 
Affected by Assignment", 6 VA. L. REV. 553, and notes in 33 HARV. L. ~v. 
970, g85, and 6 VA. L. REV. 124 
Discussions of various aspects of the judicial interpretation of constitu-
tional limitations will be found in George J. Danforth, "The Influence of the 
Lawyer upon the Trend of Modern Legislation", 8g CENT. L. J. 392, W. F. 
Dodd, "The Problem of State Constitutional Construction", 20 Cor.uM. L. 
REV. 635, "Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in Constitutional Law", 
29 YALE L. J. 137. W. L. Jenks, "Judicial System of Michigan Under the 
Governor and Judges"', 18 MICH. L. ~v. 16; Shippen Lewis, "Revising the 
Constitution of Pennsylvania", 68 U. PA. L. Rev. 120, Fred A. Maynard, 
"Five to Rour Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States", 8g 
CENT. L. J. 2o6, William Renwick Riddell, "The Constitutions of the Unitetl 
States and Canada", 4 MINN. L. REv. 165, and G. Sweetman Smith, "Judicial 
Encroachment upon the Legislative Prerogative". 3 BI. MoN. L. Rev. I. 
The practice of foreign countries in respect to declaring laws unconsti-
tutional is considered in 8 CALIF. L. ~v. 91. In 5 CoRNELL L. Q. is a note on 
the right of a legislature to validate an act previously declared invalid by 
the courts. The duty of federal courts to follow the law of the state in cases 
where jurisdiction is obtained' by diversity of citizenship is treated in 20 
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2. Requisites of Jurisdiction 01:er Defendants 
The question in Chipman v. Thomas B. Jeffrey Co.Go was whether 
a "Wisconsin corporation formerly doing business in New York, 
which had complied with the New York statute and designated a 
New York agent on whom process against it might be served, is 
subject to suit in New York on an extra-New-York cause of action 
after it has ceased to do business in New York but before it has 
revoked the designation of its New York agent. The case was 
started in the New York court and removed to the federal district 
court on motion of the defendant. In that court a motion was made 
to have the service set aside for lack of jurisdiction over the so-called 
person of the defendant. The district judge granted the motion 
and his action was affirmed by the Supreme Court. But the reason 
given was that the New York courts had said that "unless a foreign 
corporation is engaged in business within the state, it is not brought 
witliin the state by the presence of Its agents." Of course the 
validity of the service depended primarily upon the statute. If the .. 
statute did not authorize service in the case in question there was 
no constitutional issue. The Supreme Court, however, was careful 
to guard against any inference that it would have approved of such 
an exercise of jurisdiction had it been found warranted by the stat-
ute. For Mr. Justice McKenna says th;tt "in resting the case on 
the New York decisions we do not wish to be understood that t-lie 
validity of such service as here involved would not be of federal 
cognizance." Perhaps a hint of what the Supreme Court thinks 
about the constitutional issue may be gathered from the comment 
that the state court in sustaining service in a case in which the cor-
poration was doing business within the state showed a conscious 
solicitude of the necessity of making that the ground of its decision.5 '· 
CoLuM. L. Ri;:v. 612. The requirement that state courts must follow the 
federal rule of burden of proof in cases under the federal Employers' Lia-
bility Law is discussed in 33 HARV. L. R:ev. 861. 
00 251 U. S. 373, 40 Sup. Ct. 172 (1920). See 20 CoLm.r. L. Rev. 6!8, 3; 
HARV. L. Rev. 730, and 29 YALE L. J. 554. 
•
1 For notes on jurisdiction over foreign corporations, see 20 CoLUM. L 
R:ev. 205, 33 HARV. L. R:ev. II4, 14 ILL. L. R:ev. 653, and 29 YALE L. J. 567 
Jurisdiction for divorce or annulment of marriage is treated in 20 CoLUM 
L. R:ev. 479, and 5 CORNELL L. Q. 174; service of process on a person in th1 
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3. Procedural Requirements 
An interesting question touching the inherent powers of federal 
courts and' the restriction on those powers by the guarantee of trial 
by jury contained in the Seventh Amendment arose in In re Peter-
son7'2 Judge A. N. Hand of the district court appointed an auditor 
in an action at law on a contract, instructed him to examine the 
accounts of the parties, gave him power to take testimony and com-
pel the attendance of witnesses, and ordered him to file a report 
with the clerk with a view to simplifying the issues for the jury. 
The auditor was to make no final determination and his report was to 
be mereJy evidence to submit to the jury, which wa5 to retain the 
power of final determination of all issues of fact in the case. An 
original petition was brought in the S~reme Court for writs of 
mandamus and/or prohibition directeel. to Judge Hand to restrain 
him from proceeding in this manner and to direct him to restore 
the case to the calendar for trial in the usual way. Leave to file the 
-petition was granted ;;;:: but, after hearing, the petition was denied. 
The Seventh Amendment was held not to forbid changes in practice 
or procedure or new methods of determining what facts are in issue. 
The auditor·s task of simplifying the issues was called a function 
in essence the same as that of pleading. The proposed admission 
of his report as evidence was likened to statutory provisions making 
the findings of administrative commissions prima facie evidence. 
As the jury was to be free to deal with this report as with any 
other evidence and the parties were not restricted i~ the introduc-
tion of other evidence, the constitutional right to trial by jury was 
not impaired. It was recognized that the Seventh Amendment 
would forbid a compulsory reference to the auditor with power to 
determine any of the issues. As for the source of the power exer-
cised by Judge Hand, the Supreme Court found it in the inherent 
powers of courts to take action, not forbidden by statute or Con-
stitution, that will aid them in the performance of their duties. 
state on public duty, in 33 HARv. L. Rr:v. 721, 734- See also Emil W. Colombo, 
"Service on Parties Fraudulently Brought Within the Jurisdiction", 3 BL 
MoNTH. L. Rr:v. 23. 
02 253 U. S. 543, 40 Sup. Ct. 543 (1920). See Thomas W. Shelton, "A 
-Useful Procedural Innovation-Auditors in Law Cases", gr Cr:NT. L. J. 59. 
113 In re Peterson, -- U. S. --, 40 'Sup. Ct. 178 (1920). 
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This inherent power was said to be the same whether the court ~its 
in law or in equity. Owing to provisions in the federal statutes, a 
discretion reserved by the trial judge as to apportioning the costs 
of the enterprise was negatived and it was declared that the expense 
must be borne by the losing party. Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote the 
opinion of the court. Justices McKenna, Pitney and McReynolds 
dissented, without opinion. 
Several cases involved questions of procedure in the state courts. 
Chicago, R. I. & P.R. Co. v. Cole54 found it proper for a state to 
provide that the defenses of contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk shall in all cases be a question of fact for the jury, since 
those defenses might be abolished altogether. Mr. Justice Holmes 
declared that a state may do away with the jury altogether, or modify. 
its constitution, the procedure before it, or the requirements of a 
verdict, "as it may confer legislative and judicial powers upon a 
commission not known to the common· law." So, he continued, the 
state may confer upon a jury larger powers than those that gener-
ally prevail. The cases cited for a number of these propositions 
were civil actions, but Mr. Justice Holmes does not include this 
qualifi?tion in his recital. The actual decision is of course restricted 
to civil actions and is limited by the concluding statement that "in 
the present instance the plaintiff in error cannot complain that its 
chance to pr:evail upon a certain ground is diminished when the 
ground might have been altogether removed." It seemed t9 be con-
ceded that the plaintiff's intestate had been guilty of what was con-
tributory negligence at common law.5~ 
Minor complaints met with short answers in two cases. In Gold-
smith v. Prendergast Construction Co.56 Mr. Justice Day declared 
brusquely: "We find no merit in the contention that a federal con-
stitutional right was violated because of the refusal to transfer the 
cause from the division of the Supreme Court of Missouri which 
heard it to the court in bane." In Lee v. Central of Georgia R'J.'· 
.. 251 U.S. 54. 40 Sup: Ct. 68 (1919). See 90 CENT. L. J. 167 and 5 VA. 
L. Rte. n. s. 799 • 
.. The question whether the acquisition of the privilege of voting entitles 
women to sit on juries is considered in 90 CENT. L. J. 205 and 68 U. PA. L. 
Rr:v. 398. In 68 U. PA. L. Rr:v. 36g is a note on the right to trial by jury in 
will ca§es under the Pennsylvania constitution. 
'"252 U.S. 12, 40 Sup. Ct. 273 (1920), 19 M1c:H. L. Rr:v. 129. 
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c_o."7 a plaintiff suing in the state court under the. federal Employ-
ers' Liability Law complained because the state practice did not 
allow him. to su~ the company and the negligent engineer jointly 
in a single count. Mr. Justi~e Brandeis told him that such questions 
are normally matters of pleading and _practice relating solely to the 
!orm of remedy and therefore wholly questions of state law. Only 
when they become matters of substance which affect a federal right, 
as in the case of the burden of proof in actions under the Employ-
ers' Liability Law/8 does the state decision become subject to fed-
eral review. 
Such questions as that involved in the preceding case might appro-
priately be classified togethe.r under the head of substantive ele-
ments in rights of action, and dealt with under the police power 
rather than in the section on judicial procedure. Such a group of 
cases would embrace also. Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. Eggen,69 
which sustained a Minnesota statute providing that "when a cause of 
action has arisen outside of this .state, and, by the laws of the place 
where it arose, an action thereon is there barred by lapse of time, 
no· such action shall be maintained in this state unless the plaintiff 
be a citizen of this state who has owned the cause of action ever 
since it accrued." A North Dakota citizen injured in Canada was 
barred from suing in Canada by the Canadian statute of limitations. 
He brought his action in Minnesota within the time available for a 
Minnesota citizen. He complained that the Minnesota statute which 
barred him but did not bar citizens of Minnesota violated the pro-
vision in the federal Constitution that '~the citizens of each state 
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the 
several states." The Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with him. 
But the Supreme Court said that the provision does not guarantee 
citizens of other states absolute· equality with citizens of the state 
whose action is questioned, and that the plaintiff had all that he 
deserved if he had as long to sue in Minnesota as 1n the country 
where he worked and got hurt. For a year he is on an equality with 
07 252 U. S. 109, 40 Sup. Ct. 254 (1920) • 
.. See Central Vermont Railway Co. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 35 Sup. Ct. 
865 (1915), and New Orleans & N. E. R Co. v. Harris, 247 U. S. 367, 38 
Sup. Ct. 535 (1918). 
•• 252 U.S. 553, 40 Sup. Ct. 402 (1920). 
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citizens of Minnesota; if he does not avail himself of this eqnality 
when he has it, he cannot complain that it does not continue longer, 
when the restriction as to him is reasonable in itself. It may be 
observed that Mr. Justice Clarke adduces no reasons why a distinc-
tion should be made between citizens of Minnesota and those of her 
sister states, as the court has done in the other cases when a dis-
crimination has been sanctioned. The case, therefore, seems to stand 
for a principle that if citiz-:ns of other states have treatment which 
is fair intrinsically, and if they are in no way prejudiced by what is 
allowed to citizens of the state whose favor they are seeking, they 
cannot complain that a state is kinder to its own citizens than to 
others.60 
4. Faith and Credit to Proceedings of Sister States 
An important question was settled in Kenny v. Supreme Lodge,61 
in which Illinois was told that it could not refuse to allow suit in 
its courts on a judgment obtained in· a sister state, although th.:: 
original cause of action could not have been sued on in Illinois. The 
Illinois statute provided that no action should be brought in that 
state for damages occasion~d by death in another state in conse-
quence of wrongful action. The Illinois court construed this to 
forbid suit in Illinois on an Alabama judgment for an Alabama 
death, and sustained the statute as constitutional. But the Supreme 
Court distinguished the earlier cases allowing a state to refuse suit 
on a foreign judgment obtained by one foreign corporation against 
another62 and on a judgment for a penalty for violation of the law 
of a sister state,63 and held the case before it governed by an earlier 
decision that Mississippi was bound to recognize a Missouri judg-
ment on a Mississippi transaction that was void by the law of Miss-
.. On the power of a state to close its courts to actions for wrongful 
death in other jurisdictions, see 33 HARV. L. R!tv. 727; on closing the courts 
to suits between foreign corporations on a foreign cause of action, see 29 
Y AI.E L. J. 457. 
01 252 U.S. 4u, 40 Sup. Ct. 371 (1920). See 29 YAI.E L. J. 812. For notes 
on the contrary decision of the state court, see 2 ILL. L. BuLL. 361 and 28 
YALE L. J. 264 
••Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U. S. 373, 
24 Sup. Ct. 92 (1903) • 
.. Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U. S. 265, 8 Sup. Ct. 1370 
(1888). 
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i~sippi.°' Mr. Justice Holmes recognized that "there is truth in the 
proposition that the Constitution does not require the state to fur-
nish a court," but he declared that "it also is true that there arc lim-
its to the p~wer of exclusion and to the power to consider the nature 
of the cause of action before the foreign judgment based upon it is 
given effect," and that "it is plain that a state cannot escape its 
constitutional obligations by the simple device of denying jurisdic-
tion in such cases to courts otherwise competen,t." An argumer..t 
that suit was foreclosed in Illinois bec;anse Alabama provided that 
the action could be maintained in a court of competent jurisdiction 
whhin the state "and nqt elsewhere" was dealt with by saying that 
"when the cause of action is created the invalidity of attempts to 
limit the jurisdiction of other states to enforc-: it has been estab-
lished by the decisions of this court," and further that "had these 
decisions been otherwise tJ.:iey would not have imported that a judg-
ment rendered exactly as required by the Alabama statute was uot 
to have the respect due to other judgments of a sister state." 
A question of res adjudicata was decided in Napa Valley Electric 
Co. v. California,65 but as the case involved the credit to be given 
to a- stat~ judgment in a federal court, it is not technically an appli-
cation of the full-faith-and-credit clause. Yet the case is a prece-
dent that would be followed when the second action is brought in 
the court of a sister state. Constitutional question's are frequently 
questions of common: law which constitutional clauses make matters 
of adjudication in the Supreme Court. The Constitqtion brings the 
question before the Supreme Court, but does not direct how it shall 
be decided. The quarrel ·in the instant case was whether the refusal 
of the California Supreme Court to entertain an appeal from the 
state railroad commission or to order the record to be certified by 
the commission for review in the court was a· final adjudication or 
merely a refusal to adjudicate. In holding it to be the former, Mr. 
Justice McKenna referred to the "common, and at times necessary, 
practice of courts to determine upon the face of a pleading what 
action should be taken upon it." It was for the state court to decide 
what was proper practice. under the statute-whether it might act 
without having the record of the commission before it. The Cali-
61 Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641 ( 1go8). 
'"251 U. S. 366, 40 Sup. Ct. 174 (1920). 
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fornia cases were thought to show that the state court regarded the 
refusal of applications for certiorari to review the orders of the 
commission as decisions that those orders are lawful. The refusal 
in question was therefore held to be an exercise of judicial power, 
and as the refusal was not appealed from, it was held a final judg-
ment which precluded a reexamination of the same issues in a sub-
sequent proceeding.66 
IX. ADMINISTRATIVE POWER AND PROCEDURE 
Underlying all questions as to the propriety or the effect of admin-
istrative action are the constitutional issues whether the delegation. 
of power to the administrative officer is within the restrictions set 
by what is left of the principle of the separation of-powers, whether. 
the general regulations or the specific findings of the administration 
can be accepted as final, and whether the procedure indulged in by 
the administration is proper. These questions are frequently inter-
related. The finality of administrative adjudications may depend 
upon whether they were reached by appropriate methods. The valid-
ity of the regulation or order may depend upon the scope of the 
power that may be delegated. The requisites of the procedure may 
vary with the effect to be ascribed to the action taken. Summary 
proceedings may be sanctioned where the action taken is necessarily 
.. As the Supreme Court's decision of constitutional issues involving 
questions of jurisdiction and of res adjudicata depends often upon its con-
ception of the proper principles of conflict of laws, the following notes and 
articles may be of interest to students of constitutional law: on domicil, 20 
Cor.uM. L. Ri;v. 87, 33 HARV. L. Ri;v. 863, 18 M1cH. L. RF.v. 331, 332; on law 
governing question of capacity, 5 CoRNELI. L. Q. 312, 33 HARV. L. RF.v. 612, 
726, and Ernest G. Lorenzen, "The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict 
of Laws", 20 Cor.uM. L. RF.v. 247; on jurisdiction for divorce and effect of 
decree in other states, 20 Cor.uM. L. RF.v. 491, 617, 33 HARV. L. RF.v. 729, 4 
MINN. L. RF.v. 456, 29 YAI.E L. J. n9; on foreign judgments, 33 HARV. L. RF.v. 
984, 18 MICH. L. RF.v. 142, 4 MINN. L. RF.v. 546, Herbert F. Goodrich, ''En-
forcement of a Foreign Equitable Decree", 5 IowA L. Bur.L. 230, and Ernest 
G. Lorenzen, "The Enforcement of American Judgments Abroad", 29 YAU 
L. J. 188, 268; on injunction to restrain foreign proceedings, 33 HARv. L. RF.v. 
92; on service of process at request of a foreign court, 33 HARv. L. RF.v. 
978; on construction or enforcement of foreign statutes, 29 YAI.£ L. J. 230, 
329, 798; on proof of foreign law, 33 HARV. L. RF.v. 315; on "renvoi", 29 
YAI.£ L. J. 214 
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sµbject. to judicial review, while more careful investigation is. 
required for determinations that may be conclusive. Above all, the 
exten~ 6f_,possibl!'! delegation and the propriety of modes of action 
vary with the nature of tlie inter.-:sts with which the administration 
. . 
js dealing. Wide delegation and drastic procedure may be proper 
when the adniinistration is running .public business or dispensing 
public bounty, but improper when it is directly interfering with indi-
vidual liberty. Indeed, there are few, if any, general principles of 
administrative 1aw under our Constitution. Ins~~ad we have one 
~et of .rules for -police interferences and other sets of rules for 
administrative action in the :exercise of the powers of taxation or 
of eminent domain, the conduct of public business or the bestowal 
of public privileges.67 
The $:ases involving administrative action in the fields of taxation 
and of eminent domain ha~e already been reviewed. The wide scope 
allowed to administrative authorities in determining the area to be 
subjected to a special assessment 1s illustrated by Branson v. Bush68 
and Goldsmith v. Prendergast Constrnction, Co.69 The hearing 
·afforded. the taxpayer on the question of his proportion of benefit 
was held adequate in Fam.comb v. Denver,70 but found doubtful in 
Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. Severns Pa·ving Co.71 Other questions as to 
"the relief open to taxpayers ~aainst alleged unconstitutional levies 
81 See John A. Fairlie, "Administrative Legislation", 2 II.L. L. BULL. 373, 
and Frederick Green, "Separation of Governmental Powers", 2 ILL. L. BULL. 
373, and 29 YALE L. ]. 36g .. Questions oI the delegation of power are con-
sidered in 15 ILL. L. REv. 108, 18 MICH. L. REv. 328, and 6 VA. L. fuv. 441. 
Various phases of judicial control ovei: administrative action are discussed 
in 20 CoLUM. L. RE\'. 97, 33 HARV. L. REv. 462, 478, and 29 YALE L. J. 358, 
361. Cases on the liability of officers are dealt with in 19 CoLUM. L. Ritv. 
418, 20 CoLUM. L. REv. 94. 210, 227, and 29 YALE L. ]. 361. On the power of 
equity over public elections, see 29 YALE L. ]. 655; on eligibility of women for 
public offic'e, 33 HARV. L. REv. 295; on effect of Nineteenth Amendment on 
exclusion of women from juries, 8 VA. L. REv. 589, on right of de jure officer 
to salary after payment to de facto officer, 18 MICH.~· REv. 434; on expiration 
of term of office, 29 YALE L. ]. n8 . 
.. 25I U. S. 182, 40 Sup. Ct. II3 (I9I9), I9 MICH. L. Ri;v. 127. 
""252 U. S. I2, 40 Sup. Ct. 273 (I920), I9 MrcH. L. REv. 129. 
"°252 U. S. 7, 40 $up. Ct. 271 (1920), 19 MICH. L. REv. 129. 
""251 U. S. 104. 40 Sup:Ct. 73 (1919), I9 MICH. L. Rr.v. 129. 
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are "co_nsidered in Wallace v. Hines,12 Shaffer v. Carter,13 Ward v. 
Love County,74 and Bradwell v. Carter Count)•,75 though these cases 
relate only indirectly to administrative action. Administrative power 
and procedure in taking property by eminent domain is considered 
in Hays v. Port of Sea:ttle76 and Bragg v. Weaver,77 which show 
that administrative officers may determine the necessity and expe-
diency of the taking, that the taking may precede the determination 
of compensation where adequate provision is made for getting 
compensation later, and that the property owner is not entitled to a 
hearing before the administration on the question of compensation 
where the statute allows him to appeal from its award and get a 
judicial hearing of the question of what is due him. 
Administrative exercise of the police power was involved in a 
number of the cases reviewed under that head, and under miscel-
laneous federal powers and the regulation of commerce. In P emz-
sylvania R. Co. v. Pennsylvanial8 it was declared that a state cannot 
give a public service commission power to do what the laws of the 
United States forbid, whether its action be called administratiYe 
or judicial. Several of the cases dealing with public utilities show 
that an administrative order is subject to all the judicial scmtiny 
that would be visit<:;d on a direct legislative prescription. The 
requirement that administrative action regulating rates must be so 
exercised as to afford to the victim a fair opportunity to contest the 
reasonableness of the rates before a judicial tribunal was passed 
upon in St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams,1° Ohio Valley 
fVater Co. v. Ben A·von Borough,80 Oklahoma Operating Co. v. 
Love/;1. and Oklahoma Gin Co. v. Oklahonia.82 The reasonableness 
of rates prescribed by a commission was reviewed in Grosbeck v. 
"'253 U. S. 66, 40 Sup. Ct. 435 (I920), I9 MICH. L. REv. 30, I2I. 
13 252 U. S. 37, 40 Sup. Ct. 22I (I920), I9 MICH. L. REv. I24-
"253 U. S. I7, 40 Sup. Ct. 4I9 (I920), I9 MICH. L. Ritv. I33· 
.. 253 U. S. 25, 40 Sup. Ct. 422 (I920), I9 MICH. L. Rsv. I33. 
"25I U. S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct. I25 (I920), I9 MICH. L. Ritv. I49· 
77 25I U. S. 57, 40 Sup. Ct. 63 (19I9), I9 MICH. L. Ritv. I49· 
78 250 U. S. 566, 40 Sup. Ct. 36 (I9I9), I9 MICH. L. REv. 27. 
79 25I U. S. 63, 40 Sup. Ct. 71 (I919), I9 MICH. L. Rr.'Y. I4I. 
00 253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct. 527 (I920),I9 MicH. L. R.Ev. 142. 
81 252 U. S. 331, 40 Sup. Ct. 338 (1920), 19 MICH. L. Ritv: 143. 
82 252 U. S. 339, 40 Sup. Ct. 341 (1920), 19 MicH. L. REv. 143. 
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D_uluth, S.S. & A. Ry. Co.83 An industrial commission's award of 
damages for permanent facial disfigurement was sustained in New 
York Centr:al Ry._ Co. v. Bianc.84 The jurisdiction and procedure of 
the Federal Trade Commission was considered in Federal Trade 
Commission v. Gratz.85 The internal law of administration was 
involved in Burnap v. United States,sr. which dealt with the removal 
of federal officers. In Houston v. Onnes81 a suit against the Secre-
tary of the Treasury was held not to be a suit against the United 
States.88 
While the federal government has no police power as such, it 
often uses its :r.ecognized powers for police purposes. Indeed, the 
term federal police power has now won recognition even from the 
Supreme Court. Several administrative exercises of this so-called 
federal police power were questioned in cases decided during the 
past term. In United St(ltes v. Standard Brewery/9 which held 
that the War Prohibition Act of 1918 applied only to intoxicating 
liquors, it was laid down that contrary rulings of the internal r~v­
enue department could not alter the terms of the statute and make 
conduct criminal which the statute does not. In Chicago, .W. & St. 
P. R'y. Co. v. McCa.iill-Dinsmore Co.99 it was declared that the ques-
tion whether a stipulation in an interstate bill of lading violates the 
federal statute against limiting liability for loss is a question of b,,,. 
""250 U. S. 6o7, 40 Sup. Ct. 38 (I9I9), I9 MICH. L. Rr:\'. 140. 
"'250 U. S. 596, 40 Sup. Ct. 45 (19I9), I9 MICH. L. Ri;v I45· 
""253 U. S. 42I, 40 Sup. Ct. 572 (I920), 19 :MICH. L. Rm-. 23, note 39· 
.. 252 U.S. 512, 40 Sup. Ct. 374 (I920), I9 MICH. L. REv. I8. 
87 252 U. S. 469, 40 Sup. Ct. 369 (I920), supra, p. 302. 
M For a note on Ball Engineering Co. v. J. G. White Co., 250 U. S. 45, 39 
Sup. Ct. 393 (I9I9), on the subject of suits against the United States under 
the Tucker Act, see 29 Y ALe L. J. I25. For other discussions of the liability 
of a government for the acts of its officers, see I9 CoLUM. L. RF.v. 407, 5 
CORNELL L. Q. 78, 338, 33 HARV. L. Rev. 7I3, 735, I8 MICH. L. Rev. 433, and 
George DeForest Lord, "Admiralty Claims Against the Government'', I9 
CoLuz-1. L. Rev. 465. For comment on the tort liability of municipal corpora-
tions see 20 CoLUM. L. R£V. 619, 620, 5 CORNELi. L. Q. 90, IS MICH. L. Rev. 
7o8, 29 Y ALe L. J. II7, 9n. The contractual powers and liabilities of munic-
ipal corporations are treated in 20 CoLUM. L. Rev. 336, 349, and 29 YALe L. J. 
364. On another phase of the law of municipal corporations, see Richard W. 
Montague, "Law of Municipal Home Rule in Oregon", 8 CAI.IF. L. Rr:v. 15I. 
"'25J U. S. 210, 40 Sup. Ct. 139 (I920) . 
..,253 U. S. 97, 40 Sup. Ct. 504 (I920). 
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which the courts must decide for themselves, regardless of any 
determination by the Interstate Cotnmerce Commission that the 
stipulati~n in question is reasonable. 
The effect to be given to a reparation order of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission was considered in Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. 
F. R. Co.91 The statute provided that the order of the commis:,ion 
that reparation is due the shipper should be prinia facie evidence in 
actions brought by him against the carrier in courts. The carrier 
based his objections to such weight being accorded to the commis-
sion's findings on the ground that its procedure was unduly lax. 
Its reception of hearsay evidence was overlooked, not on the ground 
that it was entitled to accept such evidence, but for the reason that 
the carrier had failed to object to its reception on the ground of 
hearsay during the hearing before the commissioner. Yet the opin-
ion hints that the commission has wide latitude in the matter of 
evidence, especially when its findings . are made only prima facie 
evidence. It was explicitly declared that where the essential facts 
found by the commission are based on substantial evidence, and 
there has been no denial of the right to a fair hearing, its findings 
and order will not be rejected because improper evidence was admit-
ted or the best possible available evidence was not produced or 
because a different conclusion might have been reached. 
Two more important cases protected Chinamen from deportation 
orders of immigration.officials. Both involved Chinamen who had 
previously been. in the United States and were returning to the 
United States after a temporary visit ·to China. White v. Ching 
Fong92 involved an alien who was conceded by the administrat;ve 
authorities to have been previously in thi~ country, but who was 
ordered deported on the strength of an administrative finding that 
his original entry was unlawful. A ~vrit of habeas corpus was 
a warded on the ground that under the statute a Chinese person 
already in the United States is entitled to a judicial determination 
of his right to remain and that this right is not lost by a temporary 
visit to China. His situation upon his return is not that of one first 
seeking to enter. 
01 253 U. S. II7, 40 Sup. Ct. 466 (1920). 
"'253 U.S. 90, 40 Sup. Ct. 449 (1920). 
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. Kwack Jan Fat v. White93 had to do with a claim to citizenship. 
Here the petitioner while in this country and intending to visit 
China file4 an application as provided by law for a "preinvestig-c1.-
tion of his claimed status ·as an American citizen." The investiga-
tion resuited in an official determination that he was an American 
citizen. During his absence in China anonymous communicatioris 
to the commissioner of immigration started a new investigation, and 
upon his return he was denied entry. Objections to the hearing 
accorded on this occasion included the facts that the examining 
i~spector submitted to the commissioner as evidence statements 
reported to be made by unnamed persons, that a demand by the 
petitioner for the names was refused, and that the examining inspec-
tor failed to record in the testimony taken the fact that thi> three 
white persons of reputable character who testified to the petitioner's 
American citizenship were confronted with him an<l recognized him 
as the boy they had knowri in his youth. These allegations were 
admitted by demurrer. V/hile the court indicated disapproval of 
the reception in evidence of unswom statements by unnamed per-
sons, it stated that in view of the declaration by the commissioner 
that this report did not influence his decision, it might not say that 
this "rendered the hearing so manifestly unfair as to require rever-
sal, if there were nothing else objectionable in the record." But the 
failure to record the. fact that there was mutual recognition between 
the petitioner and the three white witnesses was held enough to 
entitle the petitioner to a writ of habeas corpus. While the decision 
goes on the ground that the hearing did not fulfil the requirements 
of the statute, it is likely that the court wot.!ld hold, if necessary, 
that a fair hearing on the question. of citizenship is essential to d11e 
process of law. Having found the administrative hearing unfair, 
the Supreme Court ordered the di~trict court to hear and determine 
the quest~on of citizenship on its merits, after the practice approved 
in an earlier case.H It would seem that under the Chin Fong case, 
just considered, the petitioner was also entitled to a judicial hearing 
"'253 U. S . .454. 40 Sup. Ct. 566 (1920). 
H Chin How v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, 28 Sup. Ct. 201 (1go8). For 
a discussion of this procedure see "Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
in Immigration Proceedings'.', 32 HARV. L. Rtv. 360. 
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because he had concededly been a long-time resident prior to his 
recent visit to China. 
Plainly greater latitude is allowed administrative officers in action 
which decides only whether individuals are entitled to the benefits 
conferred by statutes. Thus, in United States v. Lane9~ the court 
accepted without question the finding of the land department that 
work done by a prospector was not enough to entitle him to .privi-
leges open to those who have "opened or improved"· a coal mine. 
Mr. Justice McKenna said that, where there is discretion, the find-
ing of the land department, though disputable, is impregnable to 
mandamus. So, in Cameron v. United States96 it was held that the 
findings of the Secretary of the Interior that a tract covered by a 
mineral location is not mineral land, and that there had been no 
sufficient discovery, are conclusive, in the absence of fraud or impo-
sition. United States v. Poland&r held that where a land patent was 
issued by land officers in violation of the statute the government is 
entitled to have it canceled unless a successor of the patentee is a 
bona fide purchaser. A patent was also canceled in United States 
v. Southern Pacific Co.95 In this same group may be put Natio1ial 
Lead Co. v. United States,90 which accepted the interpretation of 
the Treasury Department that the drawback allowed on exportation 
of products from raw materials previously imported should, when 
more than one product is derived from those materials, be appor-
tioned according to the relative value of the respective products and 
not according to their relative weight. This was an instance where 
the administration had to fill in a gap in the statute. Though in 
the particular case the court plainly thought the administrative 
ruling right in itself, it often shows an inclination not to substitute 
its opinion for that of the administration, particularly when the 
complainant is in the position of looking a gift horse in the month. 
Several cases involved administrative determinations in the course 
of carrying on government business. Grand Trunk U7 estern R·y. 
"'250 U.S. 549, 40 Sup. Ct. 33 (1919). 
00 252 U.S. 450, 40 Sup. Ct. 410 (1920). 
01 251 U.S. 221, 40 Sup. Ct. 127 (1920) . 
..,251 U. S. l, 40 Sup. Ct. 47 (1919). See 20 Cor.uM. L. ~v. 228. 
•252 U.S. 140, 40 Sup. Ct. 237 (1g2o). . 
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Cp. v. United States100 refused to give weight to a long-continued 
administrative construction that a certain statute relating to over-
payments f_or carrying the mails does not apply to a certain railroad, 
where this construction was due to a mistake of fact as to whether 
the road "in question was i~ the class of the land-aided roads. In 
Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. United States101 it was held that the fail-
ure of the Postmaster General to fine companies for less than twenty-
four hours' delay in delivery of the mails is not to be taken as an 
administrative construction that the statute empowered him to 
impose fines only when the delay exceeds twenty-four hours. N cw 
York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. United States102 accepted the adminis-
trative practice of weighing "the mails only once in four years, as 
warranted by the letter of the statute. The Mail Divisor Cases103 
held railroads bound by the average weight of mails determined by 
the administration. Only four of the judges thought that the 
method employed was warranted by the statute, but two others held 
the statute directory only and not mandatory. and thought that, since 
the Postm~ster General had discretion as to the rate of pay and 
as the companies had carried the mails on his terms when they were 
not by law obliged to, they were bound by the conditions under 
which they undertook the service. In Eastern E.-rtension, Austral-
asia & Clzina Tel. Co. v. United States104 and E. W. Bliss Co. v. 
United States10a the court had to consider whether the action of 
administrative officers .had been such as to create a claim against 
the government on which it would be subject to suit in the court of 
claims.106 
Two cases involved administrative dealings with the Indian tribes. 
United States v. Omaha Tribe of lndians101 denied recovery' against 
100 252 U.S. u2, 40 Sup. Ct. 309 (1920). 
"'
1 252 U.S. 147, 40 Sup. Ct. 257 (1920). 
10
'251 D. S. 123, 40 Sup. Ct. 67 (1919). Mr. Justice Brandeis dissents. 
See 29 Y ALS L. J. 666. 
103 251 U.S. 326, 40 Sup. Ct. 162 (1920). Justices Day and Van Devanter 
dissent. Mr. Justice McReynolds did not sit. 
10
' 251 U. S. 355, 40 Sup. ·Ct. 168 (1920). 
""' 253 U. S. 187, 40 Sup. Ct. 455 ( 1920). 




' 253 U. S. 275, 40 Sup. Ct. 522 (i920). 
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the 'United States for d-:predations committed by a hostile tribe, and 
held that the agreement in a treaty to give protection so long as the 
President may deem it necessary imposed no liability in the absence 
of a finding that there was failure to provide such protection as the 
President deemed necessary. The case illustrates the principle that 
a right dependent upon administrative action cannot arise unless 
the requisite action is taken. United States v. Payne108 held that 
the Secretary of .the Interior is the final judge of whether names 
shall be enrolled as members of the Creek Nation and that until he 
has taken final action he qiay abandon his preliminary conclusions. 
The Secretary had written the commissioner approving his report, 
bnt he was allowed to rescind this without giving any hearing or 
adducing any reasons. Such action prior to any actual enrollment 
was held not to deny due process of law. 
Two other cases accepted long-continued administrative construc-
tions of statutes. Ash Sheep Co. v. United States100 adopted the 
administrative conclusion that "cattle" includes sheep. in view of 
warrant in the dictionaries aided by the presumption that Congress 
would have amended the statute had it disliked the administrative 
interpretation of its scope. In Corsicana National Bank v. John-
son110 Mr. Justice Pitney declared: 
"Whatever view we might entertain, were the matter res 
nova., we are advised that by the practice and administ.rative 
rulings of the Comptro1ler of the Currency during a long 
period, if not from the beginning of national banking, 1iabili-
ties which are incurred by one person avowedly and in fact 
as surety or as indorser for money borrowed by another arc 
not included in the computation. We feel constrained to 
accept this as a practical construction of the section. "" * *" 
The question arose in a suit by a national bank against one of its 
offic-:rs for loaning amounts in excess of that permitted by the 
statute to a single borrower. 
10
•253 U. S. 209, 40 Sup. Ct. 513 (1920). 
100 252 U.S. 159, 40 Sup. Ct. 241 (1920). 
110 251 U. S. 68, 40 Sup. Ct. 82 (1919). 
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X. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 
Several of the cases already reviewed involve relations between 
the states and the United States. In Hawke v. Smith111 and National 
Prohibiticm Cases112 it was settled that a state legislature acts as a 
federal agency in passing upon proposed amendments to ..the federal 
Constitution, and that therefore a state cannot subject the action 
of .the legislature to a referendum. Evans v. National Bpnk of 
Savannah113 illustrates the familiar rule that national banks are sub-
ject to state control only to the extent permitted by.Congress,. Ervien 
v.· United States114 shows that a stipulation in an enabling act as to 
the use to be made of lands .therein granted to the thereby newly-
created state is binding. on the state after it attains a full-fledged 
status and will he enforced by the federal courts. United States v. 
Osage Coimty115 lets the United States as guardian of Indians sue 
in a federal court to protect its wards from wrongful state taxa-
tion. Dulm~ v. New Jersey116 holds that th~ original jurisdiction 
.of the Supreme Court in controversies to which a state is a party 
is confined· to cases in which the federal judicial power extends to 
suits against a state, and therefore does not include a suit sought 
to be brought against a state by one of its citizens.117 
Relations between states brought ~everal cases to the Supreme 
Court. Questions of fact with regard to boundaries w~re adjudi-
cated in .Minnesota v. 117isconsin118 and Arkansas v. 111ississippi.119 
In Ohio v. West Virginia120 and Penns'ylvania v. T¥ est Virginia121 
m253 U. S. 22I, 40 Sup. Ct. 495 (I920), I9 MrcH. L Rr:v. 2. 
in 253 U. S. 350, 40 Sup. Ct. 486 ( I920), I9 MICH. L. Rtv. 4. 
U3251 U. S. 108, 40 Sup. Ct. 58 (I9I9), I9 MICH. L. Rr:v. 18. 
"" 251 U. S. 4I, 40 Sup. Ct. 75 (1919), 19 MICH. L. REY. 16. 
m 251 U. S. 128, 40 Sup. Ct. 100 (1919), 19 MICH. L. REY. 17. 
""'251 U. S. 3n, 40 Sup. Ct. 154 ( 1920), supra, p. 301. 
11
' A question of intergovernmental relations is considered in M. G. Wal-
lace, "Taxation by the States of United States Bonds Held by Corporations", 
6 VA. L. Rr:v. 20. 
'"252 U. S. 273, 40 Sup. Ct. 314 (I920). 
tn252 U. S. 344, 40 Sup. Ct. 333 (1920). 
On such questions of fact as those iqvolved in this and in the preceding 
case, see Harvey Hoshour, "Boundary Controversies Between States Border-
ing on a Navigable River", 4 MINN. L. Rr:v. 463. 
100 252 U.S. 563, 40 Sup. Ct. 357 (1920). 
ttt252 U.S. 563, 40 Sup. ·Ct. 357 (1920). 
CONSTITUTIONAL I.AW IN I9I9-I920 323 
the court granted motions to consolidate the cases for the purpose 
of taking testimbny, and appointed a commissioner for that pur-
pose. Four cases each styled Oklahoma v. Texas122 dealt with 
petitions to intervene or granted leave to file them. One issued an 
order granting an injunction and appointing a receiver, and another 
issued an order instructing the receiver. 
Columbia University. THOMAS REED POWELL. 
=252 U. S. 372, 40 Sup. Ct. 353 (1920); 253 U. S. 465, 40 Sup. Ct. 58o, 
s&>. 582 (1920). 
